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This article explains how the Monetary Control Act (MCA) of 1980 paved the way for 
the transition away from paper to electronic check clearing and processing, ultimately 
leading to the successful implementation of the Check Clearing for the 21st Century 
Act (Check 21) in 2003. 
There has been a great deal of discussion 
lately about the Federal Reserve System 
and its role in providing financial ser-
vices. Since its founding in 1913 as the 
nation’s central bank and monetary policy-
maker, the Fed has also 
played an important role 
as a payments interme-
diary, providing check 
clearing services to banks 
(figure 1). However, 
until the Depository  
Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control 
Act (MCA) of 1980, the 
provision of financial 
services by the Federal 
Reserve was largely 
based on a club pricing 
arrangement: Member 
banks received all Fed 
payment services for free, 
whereas nonmembers 
could not obtain them 
from the Fed at any 
price.2 Before the MCA, 
nonmembers had little access to Fed 
services and used correspondent banks 
to get access for a fee (or compensating 
balances). Such a pricing arrangement 
led to some inefficiencies, especially in 
the handling of checks.3 These ineffi-
ciencies were coupled with relatively 
expensive paper check processing 
systems that were beginning to seem 
outdated compared with electronic 
payments processing.
In the long run, maintaining large-scale 
inefficient paper check processing would 
not be smart public policy. Yet disrupting 
a well-functioning means of payment, 
in the short run, is also undesirable. 
The Federal Reserve and the banking 
industry needed to devise a plan that 
would allow for a smooth transition away 
from paper to electronic check clearing 
and processing. We argue that the MCA 
paved the way for this transition, leading 
to the successful implementation of the 
Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act 
(Check 21) in 2003. It is worth stressing 
the quarter-century gap between these 
two laws. While that might seem like a 
long time, changes in technology and 
in the payments market as a whole had 
to occur before specific solutions such 
as Check 21 could be developed in re-
sponse to the general imperative set 
forth by the MCA. 
The MCA 
The impetus of the MCA was twofold. 
The law provided that nonmember 
banks had to adhere to the rules of the 
Federal Reserve. It also gave banks more 
freedom to set interest rates and to 
merge. As a result of the MCA, begin-
ning in 1981, the Fed began charging 
banks for services that had previously 
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25,000been free to member banks. While the 
aim of the MCA was to address inequities 
between member and nonmember banks 
rather than to lower prices, the law none-
theless had the effect of pushing the Fed 
in the direction of cost efficiency. Under 
the MCA, the Fed would need to com-
pete with the private sector when pro-
viding payment services. Thus, the Fed 
had to set prices to recover its full costs 
plus an upward adjustment to imitate 
the cost of capital faced by private sector 
competitors. In testimony preceding the 
MCA legislation, then-Federal Reserve 
Chairman Paul A. Volcker stated, “In 
principle, [pricing of payment services] 
is acceptable to the Federal Reserve. 
Intelligently implemented, we believe 
this approach can contribute to the ef-
ficiency, competition, and safety of the 
financial system.”4 
It was understood that if the MCA be-
came law, the Fed could continue to act 
as an operator in the payments system, 
but it would be subject to a different set 
of constraints. In essence, the act made 
the Federal Reserve take explicit account 
of efficiency considerations in its pay-
ment operations. The enactment of the 
MCA compelled the Federal Reserve 
Banks to begin charging for check services 
to member and nonmember banks 
alike. But since the Fed and commer-
cial banks would now compete directly 
with one another in various payments 
markets, the act sought to remove the 
inherent competitive advantages the 
Reserve Banks had as a result of their 
quasi-government status. 
As the act was implemented, the Reserve 
Banks were obliged to include a private 
sector adjustment factor (PSAF) when 
calculating their costs.5 The PSAF had 
the effect of forcing the Reserve Banks 
to operate as if they were private sector 
competitors. Each would be obliged to 
take into account financial costs, return 
on equity capital, taxes, and certain 
other expenses, such as deposit insur-
ance, that are not explicitly incurred by 
Reserve Banks but would be by their 
competitors—private correspondent 
banks and third-party processors. Under 
this new MCA pricing regime, the Fed 
either had to be sufficiently efficient as 
a payments operator or exit from a priced 
activity (such as check clearing) when-
ever full costs inclusive of the PSAF ex-
ceeded revenues on that activity over a 
period of years. Some observers initially 
felt the Fed would be unable to compete 
successfully with private check clearing 
operators and be forced to leave the 
payments business relatively quickly.6 
The law pushed the Fed toward more 
efficient payments processing and led 
the Federal Reserve System to concen-
trate on its core competencies. 
In 1980, the MCA was enacted and the 
Federal Reserve System cleared approxi-
mately 15.7 billion checks. Check clearing 
volume at the Reserve Banks faltered a 
little immediately after the passage of 
the act but then regained a foothold, 
with volumes finally peaking in 1992 as 
consumers’ appetite for paper checks 
first began to wane (figure 1). On bal-
ance, the Fed continued to compete 
successfully in clearing checks even with 
the extra cost hurdle imposed by the 
necessity of meeting the PSAF require-
ment. Indeed, it appears that in the most 
recent decade, the Fed maintained 
approximately the same share of total 
checks it cleared in the 1970s before the 
MCA.7 The Fed created a more sophis-
ticated pricing structure, moving from 
just three products in the pre-MCA era 
(with prices determined by the custom-
er’s location) to hundreds of different 
price points after the MCA’s passage. 
Check processing systems became more 
sophisticated as a result of the MCA as 
well. Because the Fed needed to be able 
to transport checks to more locations 
than before, including rural areas, the 
Reserve Banks needed to find a way to 
address availability issues. In the early 
1980s, Reserve Banks instituted changes 
to help expedite checks drawn on out-
of-state institutions, and these efforts 
were reinforced with the passage of the 
Expedited Funds Availability Act in 1987. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, market forces 
(such as the advent of free checking, 
which led to increased check usage) and 
electronic check processing actually led 
to increases in check volume at some 
Reserve Banks.8
One could overstate the importance of 
the MCA for Check 21. On the one 
hand, the Fed has always had a public 
policy interest in having an efficient 
payments system. On the other hand, 
while the drafters of the MCA could not 
have foreseen the technological advances 
that would eventually begin to transform 
the payments industry over the subse-
quent decades, it did pave the way in a 
sense. In particular, it caused the Fed to 
operate its financial services operations 
more efficiently than it had in the past. 
The Fed’s new understanding of the 
changing real-world payments landscape 
enhanced its ability to influence the 
direction of a second important piece 
of payments legislation, Check 21.
Check 21
In terms of share of noncash transactions, 
paper checks have been declining since 
the 1970s, yet they are still the second-
largest noncash payment type, behind 
debit cards.9 To facilitate the transition 
from paper-based to electronic check 
processing in the 1990s, the Fed devel-
oped systems that would pave the way 
for Check 21, including the Electronic 
Presentment Image Check (EPIC) pro-
cess that the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis’s Helena Branch deployed 
in 1999. EPIC was discontinued in 2002 
when the Federal Reserve System em-
barked on a strategy to standardize and 
modernize check processing.10 This strat-
egy coalesced with various methods that 
had been introduced to remove paper 
from the clearing and settlement of 
checks. For example, accounts receiv-
able conversion (ARC) was introduced 
in the early 2000s. ARC allowed consumer 
checks (bill payments) sent to lockbox 
operations to be electronically converted 
to ACH (automated clearinghouse) debit 
transactions, thereby truncating the paper 
path in midstream and substituting an 
electronic clearing path on the ACH. 
A more thorough transformation of 
the U.S. check collection system would 
require a more fundamental innovation. 
The Fed took an active role in promoting 
Check 21 as a way to foster innovation and 
efficiency in the nation’s payments and 
check collections systems. In 2002, the 
Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board, Roger Ferguson, testified to 
Congress that legislation aimed at defining a new paper negotiable instrument called 
the substitute check could dramatically 
reduce the amount of paper checks clog-
ging the legacy clearing channels.11 At 
the time, the check payments system, 
while relatively efficient, was nonetheless 
hampered by legacy legal and operational 
issues. Banks had to present the origi-
nal paper check to the paying bank for 
payment unless they had agreed to ac-
cept presentation in some other form, 
i.e., electronically. The resources associ-
ated with this paper check clearing 
process were enormous. However, under 
Check 21, a bank could use electronic 
imaging technology for collection and 
create a substitute check from those 
images for delivery to banks that did not 
accept checks electronically. As a result, 
most of the massive amount of paper 
in the process could be eliminated in 
midstream and the payments system 
would become more efficient.
In addition to the cost associated with a 
physically delivered check collection 
process, after September 11, 2001, other 
vulnerabilities of the paper check pro-
cessing system became apparent. One 
of the byproducts of shutting down air 
transportation after the terrorist attacks 
was a costly delay in paper check pro-
cessing nationwide. Interestingly, when 
Check 21 was introduced, it attracted 
some criticism for not going far enough. 
The law did not create a federal legal 
structure for check image exchange with-
out bilateral agreements between the 
collecting and paying banks. The Fed 
maintained that the legislation should 
not be too far-reaching, in order to allow 
the industry to gradually move toward 
an electronic process without mandatory 
standards that could disrupt the existing 
payments system. Against this backdrop, 
in 2003 the Check Clearing Act of the 
21st Century passed the U.S. House of 
Representatives with 405 yeas and 0 nays 
and ultimately became law.
Since the passage of Check 21, the use 
of check imaging has exploded and the 
resources devoted to clearing paper 
checks have shrunk drastically. The 
change of paper-based to electronic-
image-based checks has been touted by 
many as the fastest payments transition 
in our nation’s history. Since 2005, the 
number of check images received daily 
has jumped to almost 60 million.12 As a 
result of this transition, plus the growing 
use of other electronic payment types 
(e.g., credit and debit cards), paper check 
volumes are declining rapidly. The Fed 
cleared only 9.5 billion paper checks in 
2008, compared with 19.1 billion in 1992. 
How the MCA made the Fed a better 
competitor
Around the time when the MCA was 
enacted, many observers felt that a quasi-
government entity such as the Fed, oper-
ating in an industry experiencing such 
dramatic changes, would not be able to 
implement the necessary strategies to 
operate anywhere near an efficient level. 
But recall that by compelling the Fed 
to adhere to the PSAF requirements, the 
MCA imposes explicit efficiency con-
siderations on the choice of payments 
activities. Given the somewhat surprising 
success of the Check 21 initiative, the Fed 
has been able to downsize its payment 
operations adroitly to move closer to an 
all-electronic payments environment. 
In February 2003, the Fed began reduc-
ing its payments infrastructure in line 
with the waning use of checks and the 
requirements of the MCA. The objective 
was to secure a proportionate reduction 
in the numbers of locations at which 
checks were processed. The Fed reduced 
its paper check imprint from 45 process-
ing operations in 2003 to just one today, 
with a commensurate decline in the staff 
devoted to processing paper checks.13 
The focus that the Fed has placed on 
efficiency since the passage of the MCA 
almost 30 years ago has provided efficien-
cies to the payments system as a whole.
Conclusion
It appears that former Chairman Volcker 
and Vice Chairman Ferguson were both 
correct: Explicit pricing for Fed services 
improved efficiency, and the substitute 
check spurred the removal of paper 
checks from the clearing process. This 
has led to a more socially efficient pay-
ments system in which fewer resources 
are used to propel a large volume of 
transactions. While not perfect, the incen-
tive embedded in the MCA is certainly 
more conducive to producing efficient 
long-run outcomes than many static 
bureaucratic models that are unable 
to cope with changing circumstances.
Mandatory (full cost) PSAF pricing 
appears to have produced significant 
public policy benefits. It emboldened 
the Fed to be more nimble and flexible, 
to seek to improve its operations or go 
out of business. While the continual evo-
lution of the political environment and 
the economy often presents challenges, 
the Fed continues to focus on its respon-
sibility of ensuring efficiency, safety, and 
accessibility of the nation’s payments 
system. We believe the Depository  
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 is the underlying 
mechanism that helps nudge the Fed 
to remain on an efficient payments path. 
So, two cheers are in order. 
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